Frost, bip-85 key rotation for corporates using nostr IDs

Brainstorming a solution for nostr identity in company environments

djinoz

15. Oktober 2025October 15, 2025 · 2 Min. Lesezeit2 min read

This is essentially OAuth/OIDC model applied to Nostr keys. It only applies to scenarios where sovereignty is not required. It adds to nostr for use cases that aren't libertarian - lol. So reasonable for enterprise use cases or even teams where centralization within org/project boundaries are acceptable.

I dunno, just an idea.

Main Gotcha#

The user's root key remains sovereign so it should be well protected. If it's exploited then the enterprise has to ask the user to rotate. (Outside the scope).

Architecture:#

Registration flow:#

User derives key using BIP-85

Root signs delegation: "Derived key X is authorized for company operations"

Company key server validates root signature, adds to registry

Server begins including X in heartbeat

Revocation flow:#

User reports compromise via key-server

UI OR company detects anomaly

Key server removes X from heartbeat immediately

New derived key Y is registered (signed by root)

Next heartbeat only lists Y

App or Client validation:#

Receives event signed by derived key X

Checks key server heartbeat: "Is X currently authorized?"

If yes: accept. If no: reject Cache heartbeat with reasonable TTL

Why this works for enterprises:

Fast revocation - No relay propagation delays, single authoritative source

Audit trail - Key server logs all registrations/revocations

Compliance - Company controls authorization, can enforce policies

Scoped trust - Only applies within company context, doesn't affect broader Nostr identity

Hybrid identity:#

Same root key for public Nostr (direct signing) and enterprise context (derived keys via key server) Company clients check key server; public clients don't Clean separation of concerns

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Contents

3 sections

  1. Main Gotcha
  2. Architecture:
  3. Registration flow: